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This paper develops and defends an internalist account of having au-
thority for one’s claim. It begins with Robert Brandom’s pragmatist 
account of thinking which locates the root notion of reasoning in a 
primitive language game of asking for and giving reasons. The idea 
is that the authority of a claim can be spelled out pragmatically in 
terms of the social practice of undertaking commitments and attrib-
uting entitlements. It is argued that this account fails to acknowledge 
the role of the subject’s grasp of the higher-order concept of the evi-
dence on which I base my claim.
Some claims that a person makes have authority for the one who makes them. What gives a claim its authority? How is the authority 
of a claim tied to the internal states of the one who makes it? How much 
does a person have to know about the authority of his or her claim in or-
der to be fully justified in making that claim?
This is the constellation of questions I will be considering in this pa-
per. They are all epistemological questions centering mainly on the re-
quirements for a claim’s having authority. My discussion of them will be 
couched within the current internalism/externalism debate that has been 
prominent in epistemology for the last decade. However, I want to ap-
proach these questions by a somewhat indirect path, by looking at a the-
ory of cognition that was developed by Robert Brandom in a series of pa-
pers, and fully synthesized in the recent book, Making It Explicit.1 One of 
Brandom’s central concerns is: what is it to be in a cognitive state? Or, 
since his approach is avowedly “pragmatist”, the question should be put 
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in terms of an external performance: what is it to make a cognitive claim? 
Brandom’s answer to this question, in a nutshell, and put in a way that 
stands in need of pragmatic elucidation, is that a person makes a cogni-
tive claim only if she understands the significance of her claim. 
When the issue is put this way, it seems to fall squarely within the 
domain of the philosophy of mind and cognitive science. And indeed, 
much of Brandom’s discussion has to do with elucidating the character 
of significant thought, of laying bare the necessary components of mak-
ing a cognitive claim. But there is a further dimension of this account that 
chimes with the concerns of cognitivists, and that is the attempt to con-
struct a model of the development of thought, to trace the way in which 
humans have passed from primitive forms of thinking and reasoning to 
fully-fledged thinking and reasoning. In fact, Brandom combines these 
two projects—the analytical and historical—into one: we can discern the 
essential elements of our higher cognitive activities in the humbler con-
ducts and engagements of our remote cognitive ancestors. 
Brandom’s proposed pragmatic account of what is involved when a 
subject grasps the significance of her claim is fraught with meaning for 
the sorts of questions about the authority of claims that we raised at the 
outset. For as we shall see, the pragmatic view ties the notion of making 
a claim and grasping its significance to the social practice of asking for 
and giving reasons for one’s claim. Thus the concept of cognitivity that 
is articulated in this account is linked with the concept of justification by 
means of the explicative idea of having and giving reasons. I wish to ex-
plore this idea that we should understand the authority of a claim (for a 
subject) in terms of the subject’s ability to play the “game” of asking for 
and giving reasons. And I will further consider how far this account of 
authority can accommodate an internalist theory of justification.
1.
Before turning to these questions, we need to have a working defini-
tion of internalism and a general concept of justification. The concept of 
justification that I will adopt is that it consists in having (adequate) evi-
dence for one’s claim, and basing one’s claim on that evidence.2 Within 
this framework we can define four internalist requirements for justifica-
tion which determine four increasingly strong internalist positions.
(1) The first requirement is the broad one that a claim can only be justified 
for a subject by something that lies within her perspective, that is, by 
some other claim the subject makes (or perhaps by the content of such 
a claim). Or, (to put the point in the first person), whatever makes a 
claim justified for me must be my evidence; I must be in possession of 
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it, have it. It must be either one of my internal states or a constituent 
of one of my internal states.
(2) The second requirement is that whenever a subject is justified on the 
basis of some evidence that she possesses, then she is aware of, or has 
access to, the evidence on which she bases her claim.3
(3) A third position adds the further requirement that the subject who is 
justified not only grasps her evidence, but recognizes (or can come to 
recognize) that she has adequate evidence for her claim.
(4) Whereas requirements (2) and (3) allow for weaker internalist views 
that make the subject’s grasp of her evidence a wholly dispositional 
matter, the fourth position eliminates that option and requires that the 
subject has evidence for her claim in the strong sense that she is ac-
tively thinking of the evidence on which her claim is based, and ac-
tively recognizes that her claim is justified by that evidence. The in-
tuition here is that a claim can only be justified for a subject by the 
evidence she has for it (and based on that evidence) if she is utilizing 
that evidence and relying upon it at the time the claim is made.
I will define the opposing externalist view in contrast to the first two 
requirements pertaining to what can justify a claim: on this view a claim 
is justified by factors or processes that lie outside the subject’s perspec-
tive, that is, factors that are not any of the subject’s beliefs or claims and 
that may fall completely outside the subject’s awareness.
2.
We can begin to get at Brandom’s position on these various intercon-
nected topics by looking at his discussion of what distinguishes human 
(cognitive) performances from non-human responses which reliably dis-
criminate objects in their environment. Take for example the observation 
report “It’s getting warmer”. What is the difference between “a parrot 
trained to utter ‘It’s getting warmer’ when exposed to suitable changes 
of temperature and the human observer who reports the same condi-
tion”? (VU, 32) Brandom points out that: “Any physical object classifies 
its environment, or more strictly the stimuli impinging on it, insofar as 
it responds differentially to those stimuli … In an oxygenated environ-
ment, a chunk of iron rusts in the presence of water, and not in the pres-
ence of oil. By responding either way, the iron classifies its environment” 
(VU, 32). But the difference does not lie here: both parrot and human re-
sponses may differentiate the same, or nearly the same, class of environ-
mental objects. “[The difference] lies rather in the understanding of the 
classificatory significance attributed to those responses which is exhib-
ited by the one whose responses they are” (VU, 32). 
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How then does the pragmatist understand this understanding of the 
significance of a response by the one whose response it is? Brandom ex-
plains his own pragmatist approach by contrasting it with what he calls 
the “platonist” approach to human understanding which sees it as “an es-
sentially principled affair.” “Behind every practical human capacity which 
exhibits understanding is to be found a principle governing that practice. 
Understanding is a matter of grasping such principles, and subsequently 
of applying or following them” (VU, 27). By contrast, “the pragmatist 
strategy is to try to explain understanding that something is the case in 
terms of understanding how to do something, and further to understand 
understanding how in the first instance simply as being able to do some-
thing, to perform appropriately according to some practice” (VU, 28). For 
the pragmatist, practice is prior to principle, and understanding is viewed 
as mastery of the appropriate conducts of a social practice.
To return to our human observer who utters “it’s getting warmer,” 
his understanding of the significance of his report is explicable in terms 
of “further practical dispositions of the performer” (VU, 33). To a first ap-
proximation, it consists in a “practical mastery of the inferential role of 
the response,” the ability to “[distinguish] between what follows from 
that content and what does not, and between what it follows from and 
what not” (VU, 33). Brandom, then, uses an inferential model to explain 
both how a performance acquires content or significance — by virtue of 
being caught up in a verbal practice, and how subjects grasp this con-
tent — by being able to make correct inferences and distinguish them 
from incorrect ones. Although examples are not plentiful in these essays, 
the most frequently used illustration of an inferential role is the family 
of color predicates: when the parrot utters “this is red”, it does not go 
on to infer “this is not green” or “this is not a prime number”. That is, it 
does not exhibit a grasp of the inferential and incompatibility relations 
between color claims.
But humans do. And the pragmatist’s claim is that when an observer 
moves from “this is red” to “this is not green”, this is not a “principled af-
fair”, at least not “in the first instance”. It is not to be explained in terms 
of the subject’s bringing his performance under some explicitly formu-
lated rule or principle (such as that an object can only have one color at 
one time and in the same respect). The pragmatist understands under-
standing in terms of an ability to make the correct inferential moves. And 
this implies that humans can make inferences without having to grasp 
any general principles. Now if all this means is that in ordinary contexts, 
humans can make inferences without bringing to mind or entertaining 
the general principles that warrant them, then the claim is mildly unex-
citing, although certainly arguable. But in fact, a much stronger claim is 
implicit in these remarks, for Brandom is introducing a level of inference 
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that can be wholly explained in terms of (correct) moves from premise 
to conclusion, and without the mediation of any generalization. The idea 
originates in Sellars who called these moves “material inferences”. Mate-
rial inferences occur at a level that does not presuppose that the inferrer 
has explicitly mastered the logical expressions “all”, “some”, “if-then”, 
“not.” To illustrate, let us use Sellars’ classic, indeed paradigmatic, exam-
ple of a material inference
Smoke is present, so fire is nearby.
One who makes this inference does not (necessarily) formulate or utilize, 
either consciously or unconsciously, the generalization that whenever 
there is smoke there is fire. The inference is non-enthymematic, moving 
directly from the particular premise to the particular conclusion. Subjects 
correctly move from the premise “smoke is present” to the conclusion “fire 
is nearby”, and also make additional moves from the latter as premise, e.g., 
to the conclusion that going over there is going to fire. But since material 
inferential activity may occur even if the inferrer lacks the ability to wield 
formal logical expressions, we will call inference at this level proto-logical.4
We may well ask at this juncture what makes the performances of 
these subjects who have begun to master an inferential role genuine in-
ferences, that is, instances of reasoning, and not just somewhat more 
complex discriminative responses? What permits us to say that the hu-
man subject understands his conclusion (“so fire nearby”) as the conclu-
sion of an inference? Brandom’s answer, as I interpret him, is that the hu-
man’s inferences are bound up with the social practice or game of asking 
for and giving reasons.
How is the game of giving reasons played? First, Brandom follows 
Sellars in emphasizing its distinctively normative character. It is a dis-
cursive practice that “essentially includes assessments of moves as cor-
rect or incorrect, appropriate or inappropriate” (MIE, 159). These assess-
ments in turn involve the attribution (to players) of the “deontic statuses” 
of commitment and entitlement. With regard to commitment, the one to 
whom a claim-commitment is attributed is committed, first, to a course of 
inferential conduct and to making his responses conform to a set of ap-
propriatenesses. Further, a claim-commitment involves the endorsement 
(by the subject) of further claims, namely those that follow from it as con-
clusions. But more is involved, for “one not only authorizes further asser-
tions, but commits oneself to vindicate the original claim, showing that 
one is entitled to make it” (ASS, 641). Specifically, one undertakes the 
“task-responsibility” to justify the claim if challenged, by giving a rea-
son for the claim that responds to the challenge. This commitment to de-
fend one’s claim allows one to authorize others “to re-assert the content 
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of one’s claim, and hence to employ it as a premise in their own delibera-
tions and justifications” (VU, 35).
A central theme in this account is what I would call the primacy of in-
ference. Brandom clearly thinks that inferring is the primary activity of 
cognitive beings and seeks to explain justificatory contexts in terms of in-
ferential ones. The activity of giving reasons is for him simply a special 
use or application of one’s mastery of an inferential role in the special 
context of challenging and defending claims. Thus, he avers that the way 
one defends a claim against a challenge is by “producing further asser-
tions whose contents are appropriately inferentially related to the orig-
inal one” (ASS, 642). His idea is that the reasons we have and give for 
claims are just the premises of our (correct) material inferences. Thus giv-
ing a reason for a claim is, in the first instance, nothing more nor less than 
saying what that claim follows from. And further, any claim can become 
a reason for some other claim that follows from it as conclusion. He con-
cludes that “[i]nference is thus the root notion from which are elaborated 
both the justificatory responsibility one commits oneself to in asserting, 
and the assertion license issued thereby” (ASS, 642).
A second theme is that the inferential activities that fall under this ba-
sic notion of inference take place at a level that does not presuppose for-
mal-logical vocabulary and competencies. Specifically, it is the notion of 
protological, material inferential reasoning, with its coordinate practice of 
challenging and defending claims, that serves as the basis for the concept 
of justification that we have just described. Thus, along with proto-logical 
inferring, Brandom has delineated a level of proto-justificatory activity (de-
fending claims) that does not presuppose a mastery of formal-logical or 
epistemic vocabulary. But we may wonder, at this point, why Brandom 
goes to all the trouble to explicate inference and justification in terms of 
primitive logical abilities rather than fully developed, formal ones? What 
is gained by sketching this intermediate logical position on the road to 
fully-fledged rationality?
We can find a partial answer to this question by reconsidering the prag-
matist’s strategy. As we have seen, Brandom is attempting to find the “root 
notion” from which our full-blown concept is derived. And his pragmatist 
commitment is to the idea that this root notion can be spelled out entirely in 
terms of the (outward) conducts of attributing (and acknowledging) com-
mitments and entitlements, and that a robust sense of these deontic activi-
ties can be given using only proto-logical resources. So the more problem-
atic is being explicated in terms of the less problematic. A second motive 
is that he wishes to avoid accounts of justification that are “principled af-
fairs”. At some level, the subject’s claims must have authority even though 
the subject does not explicitly grasp the (epistemic) principle involved.
In the remainder of this paper, we will ask whether Brandom has elic-
ited the central meaning of a claim’s having authority for the one who 
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makes it, and whether he has succeeded in grounding this account in 
protological reasoning. I will argue that Brandom has successfully iso-
lated what I will call a manifest root-component of our concept of justi-
fication, which however needs to be extended and enriched in order to 
explain adequately our common sense of being justified and of having 
authority for our claims. To achieve this, I will attempt to construct an il-
lustrative example that concretizes all of the general points we have been 
discussing —an example of a justificatory context that illustrates how the 
game of asking for and giving reasons is played at the proto-logical level, 
and how it builds upon material inferential skills.5
We will imagine a primitive cognitive community whose members 
are good at making material inferences and correcting each other when 
they mis-infer, and we will envision circumstances in which one of them 
might be called upon to express a reason for one of his claims. And we 
will continue to acknowledge Brandom’s provocative idea that these be-
ings might engage in the practice of having and giving reasons — one 
that exhibits a robust sense of the authority of their claims, while lacking 
a formal-logical vocabulary.6
It will facilitate our task if we can assume that our proto-reasoners 
have some grasp of the concept of negation. As material inferrers they 
have already mastered the proto-logical expression “so”. We will now 
equip them with a primitive idea of negation that has the force of “no 
such-and-such there”, that is, the absence of something, there isn’t a 
thing there where one expects it to be, it isn’t around, it’s gone. To distin-
guish this primitive idea of negation from its sophisticated logical coun-
terpart, let us introduce the expression “nok” into our proto-reasoners’ 
vocabulary. If one of them opens the drawer where he keeps his socks 
and finds that the socks are gone, his perceptual report in that situation is 
“nok socks”. Or if one expects to find fire somewhere, but does not find 
it, she utters “nok fire here”. The claim “nok fire” could follow from other 
premises, e.g. “the oven feels cold,” or it could be a perceptual claim (a re-
sponse to one’s looking into a cold, dark oven). What might follow from 
it is: “We eat cold spaghetti tonight,” or “Let’s go gather some sticks to 
build a fire.”
It should be noted that we might also seek a basis for negation in the 
non-verbal conduct of the subject, viz., in the act of rejecting a claim. Af-
ter failing to find socks in the drawer, the subject rejects “Socks are there 
in the drawer,” with suitable rejecting bodily behavior (involving hands 
or head?).7 In fact, the expression “nok fire” as I defined it is functionally 
equivalent to such rejecting behavior. I will assume that our proto-rea-
soners have a practice of rejecting a claim and the use of “nok”.
George and Louise are looking for fire. Their spoken thoughts might 
be expressed in the following dialogue (with appropriate commentary 
added):
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Both express the object of their search by wondering where fire is 
and expressing their intention to find it: Fire is present, where? I will 
go to fire.8
Both see smoke in the distance, and materially infer (jubilantly): 
Smoke is present, so fire is nearby.
Another inference: Fire nearby, so going over there is going to fire. So I 
will go over there.
As they head toward the place where they expect to find fire, they 
express their expectation by uttering: Fire is in this nearby place.
But when they do not find fire in that place, they utter: Nok fire in 
this place.
After a lengthy but futile search in several likely places, George an-
nounces: Nok fire here.
Louise continues to assert: Fire is nearby, and is baffled by George’s 
claim “Nok fire here.” She recalls the smoke they saw and the in-
ference they both made (“Smoke is present, so fire is nearby.”) She 
not only rejects George’s claim “Nok fire here”, but queries it in a 
way that expresses her intention that George give an accounting 
for his claim (perhaps with a querying cum rejecting tone): You just 
uttered ‘nok fire here’ when smoke is (was) clearly present?
George responds: We have looked for fire in these likely places with the 
outcome of nok fire in these places, so nok fire here. George’s inference 
presupposes that he has some awareness of what he is doing with 
Louise and of the outcome (or expected outcome) of their activity. 
When he sees that this expected outcome has not materialized, he 
finally rejects it.9 And the crucial point is that he rejects it because 
(for the reason that) they have made a futile search. What makes 
this fact his reason and not merely a causal antecedent of his claim 
is that it is (or later becomes) the premise of a material inference 
which he gives in defense of his claim.10
George has responded to Louise by producing a correct pattern of in-
ferential reasoning, that is, by linking his conclusion-claim to the prem-
ise-claim of such a pattern. He vindicates his claim by putting it into such 
a pattern of acceptable inference. The story has a happy ending. Louise 
recognizes that George has produced a good inference and that his puz-
zling claim does after all follow after a premise that she accepts, and so 
she is now inclined to accept George’s claim (and withdraw her own). 
After a good deal of head-scratching, and reasserting of her own incom-
patible material inference, Louise finally yields.
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Having seen how proto-reasoners might play the game of giving and 
asking for reasons at the level of material inference, we are in a position to 
understand Brandom’s claim that at this level, “[c]ommitments to mate-
rial contents could be discussed, challenged, redeemed, withdrawn” (VU, 
38). Challenging a claim would involve putting a claim into question, 
querying it in a context in which it conflicted with another claim that was 
secured by some common knowledge or some readily available premise-
fact. Defending a claim would be putting forward a candidate premise 
from which the original claim followed. Discussion would center on this 
premise and whether it was strong enough to force the acceptance of its 
conclusion. Redeeming a claim would be offering an acceptable premise, 
viz., one that met the challenge. And withdrawing a claim would be ceas-
ing to make the claim (or rejecting it) if one could not defend it.11 
How then does the pragmatist view of justification stand with respect 
to internalism? We can now see that Brandom is (just about) in agree-
ment with the first three internalist positions outlined above. First, he 
seems to accept the internalist’s general conception of justification as hav-
ing evidence or grounds for one’s belief or claim, insofar as entitlement 
is linked to being in the “logical space” of asking for and giving reasons. 
A subject whose claim is justified has a reason for it and bases her claim 
on that reason, in the sense that she can vindicate that claim (in response 
to a challenge). Moreover, what justifies a claim is another claim, viz., the 
premise-claim of an inference. And further, one who makes a claim has 
access to the evidence on which her claim is based, because in the stan-
dard case she can give her reason.12
But the situation is not so clear with regard to the third internalist re-
quirement — that the subject must (be able to) recognize that her claim 
is justified by the evidence she has. I think that Brandom does want to 
say that a proto-reasoner recognizes the authority of her claim, but as be-
fore, this awareness must be understood in terms of what the subject can 
do. We can get at this point by considering, first, whether protoreason-
ers have a concept of having a reason and of giving a reason for a claim. 
Of course they do, insofar as they understand the practice of challeng-
ing a claim, that is, the circumstances in which a claim is appropriately 
challenged, and how to respond to such a challenge. In the specific case, 
George recognizes that his claim is incompatible with Louise’s claim, and 
that his commitment to his own conclusion carries with it a rejection of 
Louise’s. Moreover he realizes that Louise’s claim is a rival claim that 
challenges his own and that his entitlement can only be maintained by 
giving a good reason. Secondly, George has the idea of having authority 
for his claim insofar as he recognizes that he has a reason for it and is bas-
ing his claim on that reason, where this recognition is understood in terms 
of his readiness to give this reason if called upon to do so. Brandom has 
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enabled us to see how one’s ability to play the game of recognizing chal-
lenges and responding to them exhibits pragmatically his understanding 
of the concepts of having a reason for a claim and of having authority, 
even if the subject does not have the expressions “my reason is such-and-
such” or “I am authoritative about such-and-such” in his vocabulary.13 
Thus Brandom has succeeded in explicating a clear sense of recogniz-
ing one’s authority, but it is one that does not involve any higher-order 
thinking about the activity of giving reasons, and so does not require the 
meta-vocabulary that would be necessary to talk about it.14 I will return 
in a moment to the question of whether this account does fully explicate 
our concept of having authority.
Brandom of course does not accept the strongest version of internal-
ism, viz., the requirement that a subject is actively thinking about her ev-
idence for a claim whenever the claim has authority for her. His view of 
having evidence is thoroughly dispositional: a subject’s authority is ex-
plained in terms of her being able to give a reason for a claim – a reason 
that will become actual only if the subject is faced with an appropriate 
challenge. However it seems that such a thoroughgoing dispositionalism 
must be weakened in one respect: one who has a reason for a claim must 
at least be aware of the kind of reason she would give if challenged, even 
if she had not thought of the specific reason she might give. Would it 
make any sense to say that someone’s claim was based on a reason if she 
had no idea what that reason was until she had occasion to think about 
it? Of course this awareness of the kind of reason she would give can, in 
turn, be spelled out dispositionally, but the subject must have done some 
active thinking at some point about the kind of reason she can appeal to 
in situations of that kind.15
What is the source of a claim’s authority on this view? What is it that 
confers authority on a claim? Does the authority arise from the subject’s 
own awareness of her epistemic condition, viz., her being in the “logi-
cal space” of reasons and recognizing that she has a reason for her claim 
that can meet a potential challenge? This would seem to be what the in-
ternalist insists upon, but if it is, it is not Brandom’s brand of internalism. 
For there is a more fundamental source of authority on his view coming 
from outside the subject and originating in the attitudes and conducts of 
the subject’s linguistic peers. Specifically, a subject’s claim has authority 
(for her) only because others have treated claims of that sort as appropri-
ate conclusions from other claims, and as appropriate premises for other 
claims, in the game of asking for and giving reasons. Having endorsed 
these inferential moves, they take a player’s claim to be a manifestation of 
a commitment to the correct inferences, and attribute entitlement on that 
basis. Or in case the subject manifests an incorrect inference, they with-
hold entitlement and impose the necessary sanctions. Thus when an indi-
vidual recognizes her own authority, she is acknowledging an authority 
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that already exists and that has its origin in the takings and treatings of 
others. The subject’s self-attribution of authority presupposes and is built 
on the attributions of others.
But, we may ask, should the locus of authority be on the side of the 
subject who undertakes a claim-commitment and assumes a task respon-
sibility to vindicate the claim if challenged, or on the side of the social 
practitioners who confer entitlement? By locating the primary source of 
authority in the social practice, Brandom compromises the internalist 
position, so that the requirement that the subject herself must grasp her 
evidence is neither basic nor essential. It is not basic because it is built on 
the prior conducts of others who have already authorized the inference. 
And it is not essential because it is possible for a subject’s claim to have 
full authority even if the subject herself does not acknowledge that au-
thority (as Brandom thinks sometimes happens with observational re-
ports (see Note 12)).
The opposing internalist view that I adopt holds that the authority 
of a claim derives fundamentally from the subject’s own attitudes and 
awarenesses toward that claim, and consequently that third-person attri-
butions of authority are on a par with self-attributions of authority. By 
this I mean, first, and uncontroversially, that if one can attribute author-
ity to another, then one can also attribute authority to oneself. As a player 
in the game of giving reasons, I can recognize that you have a reason that 
can ward off an objection, and thereby grant you entitlement; but equally 
I can recognize that I have a reason that can ward off an objection, and 
so claim entitlement for my claim. Secondly, I am making the substan-
tial claim that first-person attributions of authority are fundamental in 
the sense that we (knowers) can only attribute entitlement to another if 
the other attributes it to herself. The subject herself must have the same 
(dispositional) attitudes toward her evidence that others have toward it, 
if her claim has authority for her. There is, however, this asymmetry in 
the two positions: she can be justified if we fail to grasp her evidence (in 
the particular case), but not if she fails to grasp it.16 Of course, my subject-
centered internalism presupposes that the subject is a player in a social 
game of asking for and giving reasons, and this in turn presupposes that 
the subject’s inferences conform to the proprieties of inference that have 
already been established by the community of speakers. But it is possi-
ble to admit this without at the same time according a more fundamental 
importance to the takings and treatings of others (towards me), as against 
the takings and treatings of others towards themselves (or of me towards 
myself). And so it still can be maintained that a subject’s claim can only 
have authority if she has a grasp of her evidence at least to the same ex-
tent that anyone else does. 
Let us return finally to the difficult question we raised earlier: has 
Brandom elucidated the fundamental meaning of our common concept 
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of being justified and of having authority for a claim? And has he suc-
cessfully located the root of our concept in practices occurring at the level 
of proto-logical reasoning? My answer to both questions is a qualified 
“yes”, so all that remains for me to do is spell out Brandom’s achieve-
ment, and indicate my qualms.
First, then, Brandom has successfully isolated a component of our 
concept of having authority that is sufficiently rich to be the model upon 
which our full-blown conception is built. The sense of being justified that 
he defines in terms of the undertaking of commitments, the attribution of 
entitlements, and the challenging and redeeming of claims is a very rich 
concept indeed, and yet there is a sense in which it is still far removed 
from our ordinary conception. It may be useful to indicate what, in my 
view, still separates these two conceptions of having authority. 
First, Brandom’s view of having authority is minimalist in the sense 
that its normative content is structured entirely on behavioral-observable 
concepts that are defined in terms of publicly observable (mostly verbal) 
conducts. The account does not presuppose that subjects who attribute 
justification are even aware of internal mental states as such. This, by it-
self, is not an objection, because it is part and parcel of Brandom’s prag-
matist strategy to give an account of internal cognitive states in terms of 
outward conducts and social practices. However it is worth pointing out 
that as soon as internal mental states (good old-fashioned thoughts) are 
brought into the picture, one’s recognition of one’s own authority would 
be radically altered: for one would then grasp one’s reason as an inter-
nal thought. So we must imagine that at some point in the development 
of mind, once the linguistic-behavioral role has been conceived as the 
model for internal thoughts,17 the pragmatic-behavioral proto-justifica-
tory role on which our full-blown concept of justification is based is sim-
ilarly internalized, and the pragmatic notion of (my) commitments and 
entitlements is thereby extended and greatly enriched. However, while 
the locus of the reasons one has would shift, their fundamental signifi-
cance would not be altered.
Secondly, Brandom’s view of having authority and of rationality 
is minimalist in that it is essentially defined in terms of first order re-
sponses, while neglecting higher order thinking. Subjects who have au-
thority can cite reasons (if challenged), but they lack higher order con-
cepts that refer to those reasons and that are necessary in order to make 
claims about them. In particular, as we have seen, proto-reasoners do not 
need to have an explicit grasp of the higher order concept of the evidence 
on which I base my claim in order to recognize the authority of their claims. 
But clearly there is a deeper sense of grasping one’s authority which does 
involve the explicit grasp of this concept. And in order to have this grasp, 
one would have to be capable of saying things about one’s evidence as 
such, which entails more than simply exhibiting one’s evidence (by giv-
Pr ag ma ti sm, in te r n a li s m, an D th e auth o r i ty o f Cl ai ms 75
ing a reason). Without such a higher order concept, it is not clear that we 
can give an adequate account of the practice of discussing and assessing 
evidence. In our illustrative example, it was the activity of discussing rea-
sons (premise-claims) and their strength that was the most difficult to re-
construct. In fact, there was no discussion: George had nothing to say by 
way of backing up his belief that his premise-claim was a better indica-
tor of the presence of fire than Louise’s. His problem was that he lacked 
the necessary logical and epistemological concepts to formulate such a 
belief. And the general problem is that in order to get one’s evidence out 
on the table and discuss it, one needs to have an explicit command of the 
concept of my evidence for claiming such-and-such. George cannot get 
very far in discussing his evidence unless he grasps the fact that he has 
given evidence, and can say things like: “my claim (that) so-and-so sup-
ported my claim (that) such-and-such” and from here it is a short step to 
“I defended my claim (that) such-and-such and defeated Louise’s claim 
(that) such-and-so.” Without these enriched concepts, George’s recogni-
tion of his own authority would consist simply in his ability to meet a 
challenge by finding another premise-claim from which his initial claim 
follows. But since his challenger (Louise) will continue to feel the force 
of her own material inference, then all George can do (short of coercion) 
is hope that Louise comes to think that his inferential pattern is stronger 
than hers, and so yields to it. On the minimalist account, the game of ask-
ing for and giving reasons doesn’t extend any further than this, and nei-
ther does George’s grasp of the authority of his claim.
Brandom, of course, emphasizes the importance of mastering log-
ical expressions in order to make explicit the full significance of one’s 
material inferential reasoning. I, on the other hand, am pointing to the 
need to have a mastery of the appropriate epistemic expressions in addi-
tion to logical expressions in order to be able to discuss one’s evidence, 
and compare it with the evidence for a counter-claim. Once George is 
equipped with both the logical ‘if-then’ and a concept of his own evi-
dence, he is in a position to say things like: “whenever we do a careful 
search that leads to nok fire, then nok fire,” and to move toward seeing 
that there can be exceptions to rules like this (“... unless someone has re-
cently put out the fire”).
Brandom has certainly specified one clear (internalist) sense of a sub-
ject’s having authority for a claim, namely, that the subject has a good 
reason for it and can give it in the appropriate context. Moreover, in the 
normal case, the subject’s claim only has authority if she grasps that she 
can do this. The strength of this analysis is that it locates the pragmatic 
origins of our ordinary concept of authority. But while it is rich enough 
to serve as the basis of our common conception, it falls short of expli-
cating that idea. I have argued for a stronger form of internalism which 
holds that a claim only has authority for a subject in a sense that involves 
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her recognition that she can give a reason for it, and can defend it against 
opposing reasons. To do this, she needs to have a richer vocabulary that 
includes an explicit grasp of the concept of the evidence on which I base my 
claim. It is our readiness to defend our claims by means of these sorts of 
reflective, higher-order claims that accounts for our ordinary sense that 
we have authority, that we are entitled to those claims.18
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